comms Cargo feature to be compiled in.What this guide is for
Use this guide when you want:- long-lived keep-alive sessions
- peer-to-peer agent messaging
- host-side external event ingress
- a practical operational understanding of the comms system
Overview
The comms system provides:- Four LLM-facing tools:
send_message,send_request,send_response, andpeers - Three transport layers: Unix Domain Sockets (UDS), TCP, and in-process (
inproc) - Ed25519 cryptographic identity: Every agent has a keypair; all messages are signed
- Trust-based peer model: Agents only accept messages from explicitly trusted peers
- External event ingestion: Push plain-text events from stdin, webhooks, RPC, or TCP/UDS listeners
- Auth-optional mode: Signed listeners for agent-to-agent comms; separate plain listeners for external events when
auth = "none" - Keep-alive: A runtime-backed session processes its initial prompt, then remains alive waiting for future admitted work
- Runtime-backed queueing: Incoming messages and external events are queued once and admitted through runtime ingress
Architecture
Setup
Enable comms feature
comms Cargo feature is compiled in (enabled by default in the CLI; opt-in on the meerkat facade crate).Generate identity
.rkat/identity/ for the default CLI workspace realm, realm data dir for non-workspace realms).Configure trusted peers
trusted_peers.json under the active runtime root with their name, public key, and address.Run with comms enabled
--comms-name <NAME> on the CLI or set enable_comms on AgentFactory.Identity and cryptography
Each agent has an Ed25519 keypair managed by theKeypair type (meerkat-comms/src/identity.rs).
- Key generation:
Keypair::generate()creates a new random keypair usingOsRng. - Key persistence:
Keypair::save(dir)writesidentity.key(mode0600on Unix) andidentity.pubto disk.Keypair::load(dir)reads them back.Keypair::load_or_generate(dir)is the canonical entry point. - Public key format:
PubKeyis a 32-byte Ed25519 public key. The canonical string format ised25519:<base64>(standard Base64 with padding). - Default identity directory:
<runtime-root>/.rkat/identity/.
Envelope signing
Envelope signing
Envelope:(id, from, to, kind) as CBOR, then recursively sorting all map keys by canonical order (RFC 8949) before encoding. This ensures deterministic signing across implementations.Content-bearing kinds (Message / Request / Response) carry optional signed-when-present metadata fields (blocks, content_taint, handling_mode): a field that is absent (None) is omitted from the encoding entirely, so older envelopes stay byte-identical and keep verifying, while a present field lives inside the signed region because kind is part of the signable tuple. content_taint is the sender-declared content-taint declaration (clean / tainted); an omitted declaration is a real third state that receivers must never coalesce into clean.Cross-version note: an envelope carrying content_taint sent to an older receiver fails signature verification there (the older signable projection differs), so under the default require_peer_auth = true the envelope is dropped with a typed InvalidSignature error - loud and fail-closed. With require_peer_auth = false the older receiver skips verification and the declaration silently drops out of its typed view.Trust model
Agents maintain trusted peers in aTrustStore (meerkat-comms/src/trust.rs), keyed by the canonical PeerId — a UUIDv5 derived from the peer’s Ed25519 public key. PeerName is display-only metadata: duplicate names across entries are legal, while a duplicate PeerId is a hard error. Resolving a name to a PeerId (TrustStore::resolve_name) returns a typed TrustResolveError::Ambiguous when more than one entry shares the name — the store never guesses.
TrustEntry structure and file format
TrustEntry structure and file format
<runtime-root>/.rkat/trusted_peers.json with the stable persisted row shape { name, pubkey, addr, meta }; the PeerId is re-derived from the pubkey on load, and rows with invalid names, addresses, key material, or duplicate canonical identities are rejected fail-closed:Trust enforcement
Incoming connections are validated inhandle_connection() (meerkat-comms/src/io_task.rs):
Read envelope
Verify signature
envelope.verify()) when peer auth is enabled (require_peer_auth).Verify recipient
envelope.to == keypair.public_key()).Admit through the inbox seam
inbox_sender.send_connection_ingress(...)), where ingress classification checks the sender against the TrustStore. Untrusted senders are dropped with a typed admission reason (untrusted_sender).ACK or reject
Message and Request kinds). Any failed check returns a typed IoTaskError (invalid signature, misaddressed, inbox full, untrusted sender) so the listener records the rejection rather than silently dropping.Transport layer
All transports use a length-prefixed CBOR framing protocol implemented byTransportCodec.
Wire format: 4 bytes (big-endian) payload length followed by CBOR-encoded Envelope (up to 1 MB max).
Address formats
Transport details
Transport details
spawn_uds_listener(). The socket file is created at the configured path (existing files are removed first). Parent directories are created automatically.TCP transport: TCP listeners are spawned by spawn_tcp_listener(). Accepts connections and processes each in a dedicated tokio task.Inproc transport: The InprocRegistry (meerkat-comms/src/inproc.rs) is a process-global registry segmented by namespace. Meerkat uses realm-scoped namespaces so inproc peers from different realms are isolated by default. Messages are delivered directly in-memory without serialization.InprocRegistry::global()returns the singletonregister_with_meta_in_namespace(...)adds an agent in a namespaceunregister_in_namespace(namespace, pubkey)removes an agent from a namespace- delivery within a namespace is internal to the registry (crate-private send paths keyed by pubkey)
CommsRuntime is created, it automatically registers itself in the active namespace. When dropped, it unregisters from that namespace.Message types
MessageKind and Status
MessageKind and Status
content_taint and reply_endpoint are omitted when absent, preserving the
signed bytes of older envelopes. reply_endpoint is short-lived response
transport metadata for one exact request correlation, never a durable trust
route. Correlated callback admission requires a signature-verified TCP Request
and combines its signed, nonzero declared port with the connection’s
kernel-observed source IP. The sender-selected host is discarded; payload peer
addresses, UDS endpoints, unsigned/open-auth ingress, and arbitrary sender
addresses are never callback authority. The legacy uncorrelated staging seam
accepts only machine-authorized endpoints already held in runtime state.
Controlled bridge responders use the correlated path for alternate-authority
probes whose temporary listener port differs from the peer’s durable route.ACK behavior
SendError::PeerOffline.
MessageIntent variants
MessageIntent variants
MessageIntent enum (meerkat-comms/src/agent/types.rs) provides type-safe intent values for classifying incoming requests:Custom.The LLM-facing send_request tool accepts a separate, closed intent vocabulary (CommsPeerRequestIntent in meerkat-core): "checksum_token" and "supervisor.bridge". Unknown intents fail at the serde boundary.LLM-facing tools
Four tools are exposed to the LLM when comms is enabled.send_message
send_message
peers tool) to send the message to.{"type":"text","text":...} or {"type":"image_ref","source":"current_turn","index":0} / {"type":"image_ref","source":"blob","blob_id":"sha256:...","media_type":"image/png"}."queue" for ordinary delivery or "steer" for immediate steer processing on runtime-backed sessions.{"status": "sent", "kind": "peer_message", "receipt": {...}}send_request
send_request
intent + params and a correlated response via send_response. Requires a runtime-bound command authority; without it the tool reports a typed RuntimeCommandAuthorityUnavailable reason.peers tool) to send the request to."checksum_token" or "supervisor.bridge". Unknown intents are rejected at the serde boundary.{"subject": "..."} for checksum_token).image_ref entries)."queue" for ordinary delivery or "steer" for immediate steer processing on runtime-backed sessions.{"status": "sent", "kind": "peer_request", "receipt": {...}}send_message by default for ordinary collaboration. send_request is for structured ask/reply semantics only. It is not task tracking, a stronger delivery mode, or a reserved response channel.send_response
send_response
send_request.peers tool) to send the response to."accepted", "completed", "failed".null.image_ref entries)."queue" for normal delivery or "steer" when you need immediate steer processing on runtime-backed sessions. Forbidden on "accepted" progress responses.{"status": "sent", "kind": "peer_response", "receipt": {...}}comms/send returns richer typed receipts such as peer_message_sent, peer_request_sent, and peer_response_sent, with identifiers and ACK-related data for application code.peers
peers
TrustStore (plus runtime-resolved sources when a
runtime command authority is attached). The current agent and private
control-plane routes are excluded. Names are display labels and may not be
unique — always use peer_id for sends.Input: Empty object {}Response:peer_id, never name or a reconstructed address string.
address.transport is one of inproc, uds, or tcp; source is one of
trusted, inproc, trusted_and_inproc, or unknown. Check
sendable_kinds before choosing a comms operation. capabilities is a
versioned extension envelope, while meta is supplementary display and
discovery metadata only.Tool availability
Comms tool availability is reported per tool via the catalog (comms_tool_unavailable_reason in meerkat-comms). send_message and
peers are advertised even before any peers are configured, so live providers
can discover later wiring. send_request and send_response require a
runtime-bound command authority; without one they are marked unavailable with
the typed reason RuntimeCommandAuthorityUnavailable.
Inbox
TheInbox (meerkat-comms/src/inbox.rs) is a bounded queue (default capacity: 1024) with a Notify mechanism for waking waiting tasks.
Inbox::new_transport_only()creates transport plumbing without semantic peer-admission authority; its sender rejects semantic inbox items- runtime peer/event ingress uses the classified queue with an installed machine handle and returns a typed admission outcome (
AdmittedorDropped { reason }); inbox-full, closed-session, and untrusted-sender drops are explicit, never silent - each consumer obtains an exact FIFO-head claim; durable-runtime input remains queued until the runtime commits a typed terminal receipt, while volatile-control input is removed only by an exact handoff
- queue snapshots, claim age, handoff counters, and delivery correlations are read-only diagnostics derived from the canonical queue; they cannot commit, release, or reconstruct admission authority
- queueing is transport/inbox work
- durable consumption is runtime-backed admission with an exact terminal receipt
- volatile consumption is an exact FIFO handoff to a control consumer and does not claim durable admission
Configuration
Config file (realm config.toml)
Config file (realm config.toml)
CoreCommsConfig (internal)
CoreCommsConfig (internal)
CoreCommsConfig is the internal config used by CommsRuntime:{name} interpolation (replaced with the agent’s comms name). Relative paths are resolved against the base directory via resolve_paths(base_dir).CLI usage
comms feature at compile time (#[cfg(feature = "comms")]).Signed TCP remote peer
Userkat run --comms-listen-tcp when the Meerkat itself should expose the
signed agent-to-agent comms channel. This is the path for remote mob members
and other peer-addressable agents; it is separate from rkat-rpc --tcp, which
only exposes the JSON-RPC control plane.
kind: "external" runtime binding containing the
advertised address, the target’s Ed25519 public identity, and the typed
bootstrap_token used by mob supervisor bridge binding. Prefer generating this
file with --comms-binding-out; a binding that only carries an address or a
query-string bootstrap token is not enough for current external mob members.
Peer metadata
Agents can advertise a description and arbitrary labels so that peers can discover what each agent does — not just its name. This metadata flows through to thepeers() tool output.
peers(), the output includes the metadata:
Keep-alive mode
Keep-alive keeps the agent alive after processing the initial prompt, waiting for runtime-backed comms messages and external events to be admitted as future turns:Process initial prompt
Enter idle runtime-backed session
Handle incoming messages and events
Exit conditions
mob.dismiss lifecycle signal from its supervisor, its budget is exhausted, or it encounters a graceful error. A literal “DISMISS” string in a peer message body is ordinary content, not a control signal.SDK / programmatic usage
Building a comms runtime
Building a comms runtime
config.comms.mode and creates the appropriate runtime:Inproc— creates an inproc-only runtime (usebuild_comms_runtime_from_config_scopedto pass a realm namespace)Tcp— creates a full runtime withCommsRuntime::new()and starts TCP listenersUds— creates a full runtime withCommsRuntime::new()and starts UDS listeners
Composing tools with comms
Composing tools with comms
CommsToolSurface (built from CommsToolMaterial) via DynamicToolComposite, registering send_message, send_request, send_response, and peers.Using AgentFactory
Using AgentFactory
comms_name, creates the runtime, composes tools, attaches the runtime to the agent, and records keep_alive and peer_meta in SessionMetadata.CommsBootstrap (nested runtime integration)
CommsBootstrap (nested runtime integration)
PreparedComms contains:runtime: CommsRuntime— ready to useadvertise: Option<CommsAdvertise>— for child agents, contains the name/pubkey/addr to register with the parent
Agent loop integration
Inbox consumption
The important architectural split is:CommsRuntimeand the inbox own delivery- the active keep-alive/drain lifecycle path owns durable admission, while explicit control responders own volatile handoff
- formatted message injection into the session is a projection of the durable lifecycle truth
Transcript and model projection
Incoming comms are persisted as typedsystem_notice blocks with comms payloads. role=user remains reserved for human/operator-authored text. The runtime projects those typed blocks into provider-facing text only while assembling model input:
- Message:
comms.kind = "message"plus peer identity and optional content blocks. - Request:
comms.kind = "request"plus peer identity, request id, intent, params payload, and response guidance in the model projection. - Response:
comms.kind = "response_terminal"orresponse_progressplus peer identity, request id, status, and payload.
Typed peer lifecycle notices
Some peer lifecycle notices are informational and should not trigger an LLM turn. Mob lifecycle routing is typed at peer ingress (PeerLifecycleKind) instead of relying on silent_comms_intents folklore:
mob.peer_addedmob.peer_retiredmob.peer_unwiredmob.dismiss(supervisor-directed dismissal of a live executor)
mob.kickoff_failedmob.kickoff_cancelled
max_inline_peer_notifications:
None(default): use runtime default (50)0: never inline peer lifecycle updates-1: always inline>0: inline only when current peer count is less than or equal to the threshold< -1: invalid (rejected by mob definition validation; factory builds also reject)
peers() on demand to inspect the current roster.
External event ingestion
External systems can push events into a running agent without Ed25519 authentication. Surface-level convenience routes now admit those events through runtime-ownedExternalEvent inputs instead of a separate injector-owned execution path.
Event sources
CLI stdin events
Read newline-delimited events from stdin. Each line is parsed as JSON (extractingbody field if present) or treated as plain text.
REST webhook
Push events to a running session via HTTP. Auth is optional viaRKAT_WEBHOOK_SECRET env var with constant-time comparison.
202 Accepted with {"queued": true}. Runtime admission failures are returned as ordinary REST errors.
RPC session/external_event
Queue a runtime-backed external event for a running session via JSON-RPC.kind (generic_json), event_type, payload, and optional blocks. The method returns a runtime acceptance envelope on success.
TCP/UDS plain event listeners
Whenauth = "none" in config, a separate plain-text listener starts on event_address for unauthenticated external events. The signed agent-to-agent listener is never replaced.
Event transcript format
External events are persisted as typedexternal_event system-notice blocks with source, event_type, optional body, payload, and content blocks. The provider-facing source/body text is an internal projection and is not stored as user-authored transcript text.
- Stdin:
source = "stdin" - Webhook:
source = "webhook" - RPC:
source = "rpc"with optional structured source metadata. - TCP/UDS:
source = "tcp"orsource = "uds"
Delivery vs observation
When injecting events from application code, delivery and observation are separate concerns. Delivery — the service’sevent_injector() returns an Arc<dyn EventInjector>. Use inject() to push an external event into the session inbox:
- session-scoped: use the session’s primary
event_txorsession/stream_open(RPC) /Session.subscribe()(Web SDK) /session.subscribe_events()(Python SDK) /session.subscribeEvents()(TypeScript SDK) - agent-scoped: use
MobHandle::subscribe_agent_events(...)ormob/stream_open(RPC) /Member.subscribe()orMob.subscribeMemberEvents(agentIdentity)(Web SDK) /mob.subscribe_member_events(agent_identity)(Python/TypeScript SDK) - mob-scoped: use
MobHandle::subscribe_mob_events(...)ormob/stream_open(RPC) /Mob.subscribeEvents()(Web SDK) /mob.subscribe_events()(Python/TypeScript SDK)
- The agent must be running in keep-alive mode if you expect inbox events to be drained promptly.
- Comms must be enabled. Without comms,
event_injector()returnsNone. - Observation subscriptions are independent of delivery — configure them separately.
Security
- All messages are signed with Ed25519 using canonical CBOR encoding
- Trust is explicit: only messages from peers in
trusted_peers.jsonare accepted - Misaddressed messages are dropped: the receiver verifies
envelope.tomatches its own public key - Private keys are stored with restrictive permissions:
identity.keyis written with mode0600on Unix - Secret bytes are zeroized:
Keypair::from_secret()zeroizes the input after copying - ACK validation: ACK signatures, sender, recipient, and
in_reply_toID are all verified
See also
- Built-in tools reference - comms tool parameter details
- Configuration: comms - config file settings
- Examples: comms - keep-alive mode and messaging across surfaces
