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This page documents MobKit v0.8.34 (mirrored from v0.8.34). Both bundled gateways, the console/admin mobkit_gateway and the SDK-facing rpc_gateway, bind 127.0.0.1 on an ephemeral port unless the launch selects another address. This page explains the posture, the three shipped ways to publish a gateway, and the exposure gate a non-loopback bind has to pass.

Why loopback is the default

Everything a gateway serves over HTTP hangs off one listener: the bundled console, console JSON-RPC, blobs, SSE event streams, and (when enabled) the live WebSocket transport. mobkit_gateway serves that console open: it has no auth_config ingress and builds its decision state with require_app_auth = false, so the loopback bind is its only access boundary. rpc_gateway is fail-closed by default (it trusts no signing key and refuses every console request until the host passes auth_config or opts out with console_require_app_auth = false), and the common host choice is the opt-out, which again makes loopback the boundary. Loopback is therefore a security posture, not an oversight. The SDK process that spawns a gateway shares its network namespace and reads the exact http_base_url from the mobkit/init result, so nothing on the host needs a fixed or public port.

Publishing a gateway

Same host or same network namespace: proxy to http_base_url

The pattern the shipped hosts use. The SDK runtime exposes the base URL after connect() (runtime.rust_http_base_url in Python, runtime.rustHttpBaseUrl in TypeScript); the host’s own web server proxies /console and the routes it wants to publish to that base and authenticates in front. Works for a process on the same machine, a Kubernetes sidecar in the same pod, or a Docker container started with --network container:<gateway>. The port is ephemeral, so read it at runtime rather than configuring it. mobkit_gateway additionally records http_base_url in its runtime registry under the gateway state directory, so a same-host proxy can discover a resumed runtime without holding the init handshake.

Separate containers: bind a non-loopback address

A reverse proxy in another container on a bridge network cannot reach 127.0.0.1 inside the gateway’s container. For that topology bind the listener on the container’s interface and let the gate below decide whether the bind is allowed:
http_listen takes an IP literal and port (0.0.0.0:8080, [::]:8080, 192.168.0.10:8080); hostnames are refused so the bind cannot resolve differently on the next host. HOST:0 still asks the kernel for a port. The init result then carries two base URLs: The public base is advertised, never bound: it is the operator’s statement of how clients reach the proxy in front of the gateway. The Python runtime exposes it as rust_http_public_base_url (falling back to the same-host base when none was declared) and TypeScript as rustHttpPublicBaseUrl.

Rust library host: serve the router on your own listener

UnifiedRuntime::run(listener, decisions, shutdown) and ::serve(listener, decisions) accept any TcpListener, and GatewayHttpBinding::bind(addr) is the shared admission type the binaries use. examples/library_mode_reference.rs (MOBKIT_REF_ADDR) is the template. A library host owns its own exposure decision; run validate_http_bind_policy if you want the same gate.

The exposure gate: auth or acknowledgement

A non-loopback http_listen is refused at init, before any runtime is bootstrapped, unless one of two things is true:
  1. The console enforces app auth. require_app_auth is on AND the trusted JWKS carries at least one key, which is what auth_config (Python .auth(...), TypeScript .auth(...)) produces. The listener then carries its own access boundary. Note that the fail-closed default, require_app_auth with an empty key set, does not count: refusing everyone protects the listener but authenticates nobody, and is not a deployment anyone intends.
  2. The launch acknowledges the exposure with allow_remote. This is the same word and the same rule as --allow-remote on rkat-rpc --tcp and rkat mob host --listen-tcp in Meerkat: an explicit transport-exposure opt-in, not an auth mechanism. Pass it only when an authenticating proxy fronts the listener.
mobkit_gateway has no auth ingress, so on that binary only allow_remote (init param, --allow-remote, or MOBKIT_HTTP_ALLOW_REMOTE=1) can open the gate. On both binaries a refused bind answers mobkit/init with a -32602 error on the request id whose message names the address and every way out. The listener is bound right behind the gate, before any bootstrap. A fixed http_listen port makes “address already in use” a realistic init failure, and it is answered the same way: -32603 on the request id naming the address, with nothing built behind it (no runtime, no session store, and no schedule executor lease that a process exit would leave held for its full duration). Every non-loopback bind that does pass logs one WARN line on stderr naming the bound address and whether the console on it is authenticated or open. It cannot be silenced below WARN by the default filter.

Reading schedule watchdog diagnostics

Both gateways probe the shared schedule service at boot and every 60 seconds. Only Pending occurrences more than 120 seconds overdue under an authoritative Active parent contribute to a firing-pipeline stall, its count, and its oldest due time. A boot backlog logs WARN; a new or changed periodic stall logs ERROR, with a WARN heartbeat every ten unchanged polls. Paused and Deleted parents can retain Pending occurrences without a firing fault. The DEBUG schedule overdue pending parent attribution record reports separate active, paused, deleted, and unresolved counts; the probe does not modify those rows. Enable meerkat_mobkit::schedule_wiring=debug in RUST_LOG to see these buckets. Missing parent evidence or failed/poisoned reads log observation incomplete at ERROR, including at boot, rather than claiming health or attributing a stall to inactive work. A mixed report retains unresolved evidence alongside any known active backlog. Executor owner and fencing-token observations explain an active backlog only; they never grant firing authority.

Docker sketch

The host image runs the SDK and the gateway together (the SDK spawns the gateway over stdio and reaches it at http_base_url); only the proxy is published. If the proxy instead shares the gateway’s network namespace, keep the loopback default and proxy to http_base_url.

Resume behaviour (mobkit_gateway)

The HTTP listen address and the advertised http_public_base_url are both part of the runtime resume fingerprint, like --control-listen. Relaunching with a different http_listen or a different (or newly dropped) http_public_base_url creates a runtime with the values you declared instead of silently reporting a live runtime started with other ones; with a fixed port that new runtime cannot bind while the old one still holds the port, and init says so. A resumed launch (same fingerprint) reports the http_base_url and http_public_base_url the live runtime was started with, which are by construction the ones you declared.

Reading a gateway exit

Both gateways log on stderr, through tracing, at the default filter (no RUST_LOG needed). When the run loop ends, the binary writes one INFO line naming which branch ended it, runs the graceful shutdown sequence, then writes a closing bookend:
reason= is one of these tokens; signal= (SIGINT or SIGTERM) is present only when the reason is signal. mobkit_gateway does not exit on stdin EOF. It logs stdin closed by the launching process; mobkit_gateway keeps serving HTTP until SIGINT or SIGTERM and stays up, so a later exit is attributed to what actually ended it. After a signal it exits once shutdown completes whether or not stdin is still open (a terminal, or a parent holding the pipe); both gateways exit explicitly on that path because tokio’s stdin read cannot be cancelled. Panics are reported through the same stream at ERROR, with thread, file, line, column and payload fields, before the standard panic message (RUST_BACKTRACE still works). A panic on a tokio worker unwinds one task and the process keeps running, so this line may be the only record of one. How to read a gateway that is gone:
  • The “loop ended” line is present with reason=signal: a supervisor or operator stopped it. Check who sent the signal (container stop, health check timing out during a long console operation, kill).
  • reason=stdin_closed on rpc_gateway: the SDK host process exited or closed the pipe; look at the host first.
  • The “loop ended” line is present but the bookend is not: the shutdown sequence wedged or the process was killed during it.
  • Neither line, but a panic ERROR: a crash; the line names the source location.
  • No line at all: the process was killed from outside (SIGKILL, an OOM kill, a stack overflow) or aborted. The exit status names which; 137 is SIGKILL, 139 is a segfault or stack overflow, 134 is an abort.

See also