Deployment

Mirrored from MobKit main at eb16bba0b154 on 2026-09-24; MobKit workspace version 0.8.41 at that commit. Both bundled gateways, the console/admin mobkit_gateway and the SDK-facing rpc_gateway, bind 127.0.0.1 on an ephemeral port unless the launch selects another address. This page explains the posture, the three shipped ways to publish a gateway, and the exposure gate a non-loopback bind has to pass.

Why loopback is the default

Everything a gateway serves over HTTP hangs off one listener: the bundled console, console JSON-RPC, blobs, SSE event streams, and (when enabled) the live WebSocket transport. mobkit_gateway serves its protected console surfaces open by default when top-level auth_config is absent. Supplying that init parameter installs the shared JWT/OIDC configuration and requires app auth on those surfaces. rpc_gateway is fail-closed by default: it trusts no signing key and refuses protected console requests until the host passes runtime_options.auth_config or explicitly opts out with runtime_options.console_require_app_auth = false. Without gateway auth, loopback or an authenticating front proxy must provide the access boundary. See Authentication for the shared auth shape. Loopback is therefore a security posture, not an oversight. The SDK process that spawns a gateway shares its network namespace and reads the exact http_base_url from the mobkit/init result, so nothing on the host needs a fixed or public port.

Publishing a gateway

Same host or same network namespace: proxy to `http_base_url`

The pattern the shipped hosts use. The SDK runtime exposes the base URL after connect() (runtime.rust_http_base_url in Python, runtime.rustHttpBaseUrl in TypeScript); the host’s own web server proxies /console and the routes it wants to publish to that base and authenticates in front. Works for a process on the same machine, a Kubernetes sidecar in the same pod, or a Docker container started with --network container:<gateway>. The port is ephemeral, so read it at runtime rather than configuring it. mobkit_gateway additionally records http_base_url in its runtime registry under the gateway state directory, so a same-host proxy can discover a resumed runtime without holding the init handshake.

Separate containers: bind a non-loopback address

A reverse proxy in another container on a bridge network cannot reach 127.0.0.1 inside the gateway’s container. For that topology bind the listener on the container’s interface and let the gate below decide whether the bind is allowed:

Python (rpc_gateway)
TypeScript (rpc_gateway)
mobkit_gateway
Raw mobkit/init (rpc_gateway)

runtime = await (
    MobKit.builder()
    .mob("config/mob.toml")
    .gateway("./rpc_gateway")
    .http_listen("0.0.0.0:8080")               # runtime_options.http_listen
    .http_public_base_url("https://mob.example.com")  # reported, never bound
    .allow_remote()                            # exposure acknowledgement
    .console_auth_required(False)              # or .auth(...) to enforce auth instead
    .build()
)
print(runtime.rust_http_base_url)         # http://127.0.0.1:8080 (same-host form)
print(runtime.rust_http_public_base_url)  # https://mob.example.com

const runtime = await MobKit.builder()
  .mob("config/mob.toml")
  .gateway("./rpc_gateway")
  .httpListen("0.0.0.0:8080")
  .httpPublicBaseUrl("https://mob.example.com")
  .allowRemote()
  .consoleAuthRequired(false)
  .build();
console.log(runtime.rustHttpBaseUrl);        // http://127.0.0.1:8080
console.log(runtime.rustHttpPublicBaseUrl);  // https://mob.example.com

# Launch flags (or MOBKIT_HTTP_LISTEN_ADDR / MOBKIT_HTTP_ALLOW_REMOTE=1):
mobkit_gateway --http-listen 0.0.0.0:8080 --allow-remote

// or in the mobkit/init params, which win over flags and environment:
{ "http_listen": "0.0.0.0:8080", "allow_remote": true,
  "http_public_base_url": "https://mob.example.com" }

{ "runtime_options": {
    "http_listen": "0.0.0.0:8080",
    "http_public_base_url": "https://mob.example.com",
    "allow_remote": true } }

http_listen takes an IP literal and port (0.0.0.0:8080, [::]:8080, 192.168.0.10:8080); hostnames are refused so the bind cannot resolve differently on the next host. HOST:0 still asks the kernel for a port. The init result then carries two base URLs:

Field	Value	Use it for
`http_base_url`	The same-host form, preserving the bound port and address family: `0.0.0.0:PORT` becomes `http://127.0.0.1:PORT`; `[::]:PORT` becomes `http://[::1]:PORT`. Concrete bound addresses are unchanged	The SDK’s own SSE, multipart and console RPC calls; same-host proxies
`http_public_base_url`	Exactly the `http_public_base_url` the launch declared, trailing `/` removed; `null` when none was declared	Links handed to browsers and off-host clients; the base a proxy in another container publishes

The public base is advertised, never bound: it is the operator’s statement of how clients reach the proxy in front of the gateway. The Python runtime exposes it as rust_http_public_base_url (falling back to the same-host base when none was declared) and TypeScript as rustHttpPublicBaseUrl.

Rust library host: serve the router on your own listener

UnifiedRuntime::run(listener, decisions, shutdown) and ::serve(listener, decisions) accept any TcpListener, and GatewayHttpBinding::bind(addr) is the shared admission type the binaries use. examples/library_mode_reference.rs (MOBKIT_REF_ADDR) is the template. A library host owns its own exposure decision; run validate_http_bind_policy if you want the same gate.

The exposure gate: auth or acknowledgement

The shared gate refuses a non-loopback http_listen at init, before any runtime is bootstrapped, unless one of two things is true in its admission-time state:

The console enforces app auth. require_app_auth is on AND the trusted JWKS carries at least one key, which is what auth_config (Python .auth(...), TypeScript .auth(...)) produces. The listener then carries its own access boundary. Note that the fail-closed default, require_app_auth with an empty key set, does not count: refusing everyone protects the listener but authenticates nobody, and is not a deployment anyone intends.
The launch acknowledges the exposure with allow_remote. This is the same word and the same rule as --allow-remote on rkat-rpc --tcp and rkat mob host --listen-tcp in Meerkat: an explicit transport-exposure opt-in, not an auth mechanism. Pass it only when an authenticating proxy fronts the listener.

rpc_gateway applies its runtime_options.auth_config before this check. mobkit_gateway accepts the same JWT/OIDC shape as top-level auth_config, but its earlier exposure gate currently uses the open default decision state, not the later auth overlay used by the HTTP router. On that binary a non-loopback bind therefore still requires allow_remote (init param, --allow-remote, or MOBKIT_HTTP_ALLOW_REMOTE=1), even when auth is configured. On both binaries a refused bind answers mobkit/init with a -32602 error on the request id whose message names the address and every way out. The listener is bound right behind the gate, before any bootstrap. A fixed http_listen port makes “address already in use” a realistic init failure, and it is answered the same way: -32603 on the request id naming the address, with nothing built behind it (no runtime, no session store, and no schedule executor lease that a process exit would leave held for its full duration). At serving startup, every admitted non-loopback listener logs one WARN line on stderr naming the bound address and the final serving auth posture. On mobkit_gateway this includes any configured auth_config overlay, unlike the open decision state used by its earlier exposure gate. It cannot be silenced below WARN by the default filter.

Reading schedule watchdog diagnostics

Both gateways install a resident watchdog that probes every 60 seconds when persistent schedule-service inputs are available. Ephemeral launches and launches whose schedule store is unavailable do not install it. An immediate boot probe runs after the firing host successfully starts; if host startup fails, startup logs that failure and the resident watchdog still runs. Only Pending occurrences more than 120 seconds overdue under an authoritative Active parent contribute to a firing-pipeline stall, its count, and its oldest due time. A boot backlog logs WARN; a new or changed periodic stall logs ERROR, with a WARN heartbeat every ten unchanged polls. Paused and Deleted parents can retain Pending occurrences without a firing fault. The DEBUG schedule overdue pending parent attribution record reports separate active, paused, deleted, and unresolved counts; the probe does not modify those rows. Enable meerkat_mobkit::schedule_wiring=debug in RUST_LOG to see these buckets. Missing parent evidence or failed/poisoned reads log observation incomplete at ERROR, including at boot, rather than claiming health or attributing a stall to inactive work. A mixed report retains unresolved evidence alongside any known active backlog. Executor owner and fencing-token observations explain an active backlog only; they never grant firing authority.

Building with `openai-live`: link the system Opus

The openai-live feature pulls Meerkat’s WebRTC transport, whose opus dependency builds bundled Opus with CMake when pkg-config finds no system library. Install the system library in the build stage so the build links it and never runs CMake (which also avoids the CMake 4 incompatibility of the bundled sources):

# build stage
RUN apt-get update \
 && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libopus-dev pkg-config \
 && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

# runtime stage (dynamic link)
RUN apt-get update \
 && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libopus0 \
 && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

For a static link with no runtime package, set OPUS_STATIC=1 in the build stage alongside libopus-dev.

Docker sketch

services:
  mobkit:
    image: your-host-image
    command: ["python", "-m", "your_host"]   # builder: .http_listen("0.0.0.0:8080").allow_remote()
    expose: ["8080"]
  proxy:
    image: nginx
    ports: ["443:443"]
    # nginx authenticates, then proxy_pass http://mobkit:8080;

The host image runs the SDK and the gateway together (the SDK spawns the gateway over stdio and reaches it at http_base_url); only the proxy is published. If the proxy instead shares the gateway’s network namespace, keep the loopback default and proxy to http_base_url.

Resume behaviour (`mobkit_gateway`)

The HTTP listen address and the advertised http_public_base_url are both part of the runtime resume fingerprint, like --control-listen. Relaunching with a different http_listen or a different (or newly dropped) http_public_base_url creates a runtime with the values you declared instead of silently reporting a live runtime started with other ones; with a fixed port that new runtime cannot bind while the old one still holds the port, and init says so. A resumed launch (same fingerprint) reports the http_base_url and http_public_base_url the live runtime was started with, which are by construction the ones you declared.

Repairing a refused durable session

A member whose committed WholeBlob document fails meerkat’s audited-endpoint guard (SessionError::WholeBlobAuditedEndpointDivergence) is parked with a typed session_repair_required hold instead of retrying: it shows as needs_repair in the console and on mobkit/member_health, and the hold carries the two exact rkat commands for the runtime store this gateway opened. Both gateways derive that scope from their own storage composition, never from a guess:

the default persistent launch opens <state_dir>/runtime.sqlite, so the commands are rkat session repair-wholeblob <session_id> --runtime-store <state_dir>/runtime.sqlite --json (diagnose) and the same with --apply --json (repair; add --accept-shorter only when the diagnose report says the live transcript is shorter than the audited endpoint);
a composite storage provider’s meerkat-level realm renders as rkat --state-root <state_dir> --realm mobkit session repair-wholeblob <session_id> ...;
an in-memory or declared-ephemeral runtime store has no document to repair, so no scope is derived and the commands keep explicit <state-root> / <realm> placeholders.

Stop nothing: the member is already parked. Run the diagnose command, then the apply command, then mobkit/reload_member on the identity; the same verb, with no extra flag, resumes the same session and generation and clears the hold.

Reading a gateway exit

Both gateways log on stderr, through tracing, at the default filter (no RUST_LOG needed). When the run loop ends, the binary writes one INFO line naming which branch ended it, runs the graceful shutdown sequence, then writes a closing bookend:

INFO rpc_gateway: rpc_gateway dispatch loop ended; running graceful shutdown reason=signal signal=SIGTERM
INFO rpc_gateway: rpc_gateway shutdown complete; exiting reason=signal signal=SIGTERM

reason= is one of these tokens; signal= (SIGINT or SIGTERM) is present only when the reason is signal.

Binary	`reason=`	Meaning
`rpc_gateway`	`stdin_closed`	The launching process closed the gateway’s stdin (EOF) or the read failed; the reader logs which just before. Exiting on EOF is by design: the SDK that owned the pipe is gone.
`rpc_gateway`	`signal`	SIGINT or SIGTERM arrived while stdin was still open.
`rpc_gateway`	`sdk_shutdown_handshake`	The SDK’s `mobkit/shutdown` handshake asked for an orderly stop.
`mobkit_gateway`	`signal`	SIGINT or SIGTERM.
`mobkit_gateway`	`http_server_ended`	The HTTP server task ended on its own. A clean end proceeds to graceful shutdown; an abnormal one is also logged at ERROR and the process exits 1.
`mobkit_gateway`	`stdin_guard_ended`	Not expected: the stdin guard parks forever after EOF. Named so it can never be silently absorbed.

mobkit_gateway does not exit on stdin EOF. It logs stdin closed by the launching process; mobkit_gateway keeps serving HTTP until SIGINT or SIGTERM and stays up, so a later exit is attributed to what actually ended it. After a signal it exits once shutdown completes whether or not stdin is still open (a terminal, or a parent holding the pipe); both gateways exit explicitly on that path because tokio’s stdin read cannot be cancelled. Panics are reported through the same stream at ERROR, with thread, file, line, column and payload fields, before the standard panic message (RUST_BACKTRACE still works). A panic on a tokio worker unwinds one task and the process keeps running, so this line may be the only record of one. How to read a gateway that is gone:

The “loop ended” line is present with reason=signal: a supervisor or operator stopped it. Check who sent the signal (container stop, health check timing out during a long console operation, kill).
reason=stdin_closed on rpc_gateway: the SDK host process exited or closed the pipe; look at the host first.
The “loop ended” line is present but the bookend is not: the shutdown sequence wedged or the process was killed during it.
Neither line, but a panic ERROR: a crash; the line names the source location.
No line at all: the process was killed from outside (SIGKILL, an OOM kill, a stack overflow) or aborted. The exit status names which; 137 is SIGKILL, 139 is a segfault or stack overflow, 134 is an abort.

WorkGraph realms for mob members

Meerkat builds every mob member in the realm mob.<mob_id> and rescopes the WorkGraph service the gateway hands the mob runtime to that realm, so a member resolves its attention bindings there and nowhere else. The gateway’s own WorkGraph service is scoped to the same realm at construction, which is why a goal bound to a member from the console or the RPC surface lands where the member reads it. Two consequences matter to an operator:

A goal, binding or reassignment whose target names a member of another mob (an explicit owner key of the form mob/<other>/agent/<identity>) is refused with JSON-RPC -32602 and data.kind = "attention_target_realm_mismatch". It is not stored anywhere. Create that work through the other mob’s own runtime.
Bindings written before this rule existed are moved at bootstrap. A child mob spawned by an agent tool used to share the parent runtime’s service unscoped, so a goal bound to a child-mob member lived in the parent realm and the child member found it there; it no longer does. On every bootstrap the runtime scans its realm for active or paused bindings whose owner key names another mob, re-creates each in that mob’s realm over the same store (title, description, mode, policies, priority, labels, timing fields, external and evidence refs, delegated authority, projection policy and the paused state carried; edges of the original item are not), and cancels the original goal, which stops its binding. A second bootstrap finds nothing to move. mobkit/capabilities reports the run under workgraph_realm_migration (mode, scanned_bindings, skipped_terminal, migrated[] with the old and new binding and item ids, and an outcome that records a failed scan or write instead of aborting the launch). Library hosts choose the mode with MobBootstrapSpec::with_workgraph_realm_migration (apply, dry_run, off).

Blob ids are not meerkat content blob ids

A MobKit blob store applies one of two digest recipes depending on how an object enters it. Images that arrive through meerkat’s BlobStore face (Base64BlobStoreAdapter::put_image, used by the gateway, the unified runtime and the console voice host) and images uploaded through the console (mobkit/blob/upload, multipart image_upload placeholders) are addressed with meerkat’s content_blob_id, sha256(canonical_media_type || 0x00 || base64_text) over the base64 form, so meerkat’s read-back verification (durable fork preflight, realtime image hydration) accepts them. Objects written through MobKit’s native BinaryBlobStore::put_bytes (non-image mobkit/blob/* objects), and image blobs written by MobKit builds that predate this rule, carry MobKit’s own address, sha256(media_type || 0x00 || raw_bytes) over the decoded bytes (meerkat-mobkit/src/blob_store.rs, compute_blob_id). Both render as sha256:<64 hex digits>, so the same PNG under the two recipes carries two visually indistinguishable ids. The store resolves both forms through both faces, so references written before the rule keep hydrating; still, compare ids only within one recipe. The side by side recipe, provenance rules and the planned unification are documented in the meerkat storage operations runbook under “Blob digests in meerkat and MobKit”.

Getting started

Core concepts

Guides

Why loopback is the default

Publishing a gateway

Same host or same network namespace: proxy to `http_base_url`

Separate containers: bind a non-loopback address

Rust library host: serve the router on your own listener

The exposure gate: auth or acknowledgement

Reading schedule watchdog diagnostics

Building with `openai-live`: link the system Opus

Docker sketch

Resume behaviour (`mobkit_gateway`)

Repairing a refused durable session

Reading a gateway exit

WorkGraph realms for mob members

Blob ids are not meerkat content blob ids

See also

​Why loopback is the default

​Publishing a gateway

​Same host or same network namespace: proxy to http_base_url

​Separate containers: bind a non-loopback address

​Rust library host: serve the router on your own listener

​The exposure gate: auth or acknowledgement

​Reading schedule watchdog diagnostics

​Building with openai-live: link the system Opus

​Docker sketch

​Resume behaviour (mobkit_gateway)

​Repairing a refused durable session

​Reading a gateway exit

​WorkGraph realms for mob members

​Blob ids are not meerkat content blob ids

​See also

Why loopback is the default

Publishing a gateway

Same host or same network namespace: proxy to `http_base_url`

Separate containers: bind a non-loopback address

Rust library host: serve the router on your own listener

The exposure gate: auth or acknowledgement

Reading schedule watchdog diagnostics

Building with `openai-live`: link the system Opus

Docker sketch

Resume behaviour (`mobkit_gateway`)

Repairing a refused durable session

Reading a gateway exit

WorkGraph realms for mob members

Blob ids are not meerkat content blob ids

See also